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There was a time the air was clean 
And you could see forever ‘cross the plains 
The wind was sweet as honey 
And no one had ever heard of acid rain 
 
We’re torturing the earth 
And pourin’ every kind of evil in the sea 
We violated nature 
And our children have to pay the penalty 
 
Don’t go near the water children 
See the fish all dead upon the shore 
Don’t go near the water 
‘Cause water isn’t water anymore 
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Legislation      
      
   
VCLT-69 UN Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties (1969) 
   
UNCLOS UN United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982) 
   
VCLT-86 UN 
Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties between States and 
International Organizations or between International Organizations 
(1986) 
   
The Basel 
Convention UN 
The Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary 
Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal (1989) 
   
The Bamako 
Convention UN The Bamako Convention (1991) 
   
The Rotterdam 
Convention UN The Rotterdam Convention (1998) 
   
The Stockholm 
Convention UN The Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (2001) 
   
SOLAS IMO International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (1960) 
   
MARPOL IMO 
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from 
Ships (1978) 
   
HKC IMO 
Hong Kong International Convention for the Safe and 
Environmentally Sound Recycling of Ships (2009) 
   
C138 ILO Convention no 138 on the Minimum Age (1973) 
   
TFEU EU Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (1957/2009) 
   
EEA-Agreement EU EEA The Agreement on the European Economic Area (1992) 
   
EWSR EU Regulation (EC) No 1013/2006 on Shipments of Waste 
   
WFD EU Directive 2008/98/EC on Waste 
   
ECD EU 
Directive 2008/99/EC on the Protection of the Environment 
through Criminal Law 
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PSTD EU Directive 2009/16/EC on Port State Control 
   
ESRR EU Regulation (EU) No 1057/2013 on Ship Recycling 
   
The Code India Shipbreaking Code (2013) 
   
The Act India The Recycling of Ships Act (2019) 
   
 Bangladesh Labour Act (XLII of 2006) 
   






































abbreviations      
      
   
BAN  Basel Action Network 
   
BCTG  
Technical guidelines on the environmentally sound management of 
the full and partial dismantling of ships 
   
CIEL  Center for International Environmental Law 
   
CoP  Conference of the Parties to the Basel Convention 
   
EME  Eide Marine Eiendom 
   
EMSA  European Maritime Safety Agency 
   
ESM  Environmentally sound management 
   
EUTG  
Technical Guidance not under Regulation (EU) No 1257/2013 on 
ship recycling (2016/C 128/01) 
   
GT  Gross tonnage 
   
IHM  Inventory of hazardous wastes  
   
LDT  Light displacement tonnage 
   
MoU  memorandum of understanding 
   
NBIM  Norges Bank Investment Management 
   
NGO  The NGO Shipbreaking Platform 
   
NIMBY  Not in my back yard 
   
PIC  Prior informed consent 
   
SoC  Statement of Compliance 
   
SRTI  Ship Recycling Transparency Initiative 
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The Community  EU and EEA Member States 
   


















































1 An introduction to the world of ship recycling 
The topic of this thesis is the public international law and EU-law that regulate the global ship 
recycling industry. Ship recycling is a large industry where the recycling itself and the practices 
employed in the process have a strong impact the environment and human health alike. Due to 
the transnational nature of shipping and the global nature of the interests involved, the industry 
is regulated through public international law.  
 
The objective of this thesis is to analyse the EU Regulations’ points of friction with international 
law and regulatory challenges of avoidance and efficiency, as well as the feasibility of the 
Commissions’ preliminary «proposed way forward».1 
 
Ship recycling is currently regulated on an international level by the Basel Convention on 
waste-shipments, made by the UN in 1989.2 Another relevant international convention is the 
Hong Kong Convention on ship recycling, created by the IMO in 2009.3 The latter is as of 
December 2020 not fully ratified, but it is expected to enter into force in a not-too-distant future 
and its signatories are already implementing the convention into their domestic law. In the EU 
and EEA Member States,4 ship recycling is regulated mainly by two EU-regulations, the 
EWSR5 and the ESRR.6 The first regulation is an EU implementation the Basel Convention 
that the EU is an independent Party to, while the second is an EU facilitator for the HKC to 
which the EU cannot be Party.7 
 
The various bodies that govern the ship recycling industry differ in several aspects; they have 
different authority, jurisdiction, composition, legislative procedures and last but not least, there 
are different interests to protect on international, regional and domestic levels. Interests also 
vary between the bodies on the same level of governance. Where the Basel Convention is based 
on equal voting rights for all its Parties, the IMO-system favour States with a strong presence 
in the ship recycling industry, and the interests of a developed country differs from those of a 
                                               
1 Infra, p. 4. 
2 The Basel Convention on Transboundary Shipments of Wastes and their disposal; referred to as «the 
Convention» being the one currently in force. 
3 The Hong Kong Convention on the Safe and Environmentally sound Recycling of Ships; IMO is the UN’s 
specialised agency for the safety, security and environmental performance in international shipping. 
4 Referred to as «the Community». Although the EEA is not part of the EU, it’s sensible to include EEA in the 
term ‘Community’, mutatis mutandis, since the Regulations hardly make the distinction. When the distinction is 
required, the thesis refers to the EU as ‘Member States’.  
5 Regulation (EC) No. 1013/2006. 
6 Regulation (EU) No. 1257/2013. 
7 Unlike the UN, the IMO allow only States to be Party to its conventions, cf. Basel art. 22(1) contra HKC art. 
16. 
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developing country.8 The diverging interests between the actors are made an even more 
complicating factor for ship recycling by the Flag State rule, which separates the jurisdiction of 
a ship from that of the shipping company or beneficial owner of the ship.9 All Parties to the 
HKC is already Party to the Basel Convention, and so the HKC, both EU Regulations and the 
domestic legislation in the Community and third countries must all be in compliance with the 
Basel Convention. The result is a complex legal matrix of multilevel governance on an 
international scale: 
 
Figure 1: My own graphic illustration of the structure of multilevel governance in ship recycling legislation. 
 
For the sake of the Community, both the regulatory regimes of the Basel Convention and the 
Hong Kong Convention has been implemented in Community law through the EU 
Regulations.10 The facilitating ESRR and the coming-into-force of the new HKC is creating a 
new dynamic and friction in the ship recycling legislation both in the EU and internationally.  
 
                                               
8 Basel art. 25(1); HKC art. 17; Infra, subchapter 1.2. 
9 UNCLOS art. 91(1). 
10 Regulations have direct effect vertically and horizontally within EU, cf. TFEU art. 288, Cf. CJEU Case 43-
71 (1971), para. 9; Unlike the Member States, EEA have not delegated legislative powers to the EU, and 
consequentially all regulations must be implemented to take effect, cf. EEA Agreement art. 3 and art. 7(a); 
Issues surrounding individual obligations and/or compliance under Basel and Member States’ delegation of 
legislative powers, TFEU art. 216(2) cf. CJEU Case C-344/04 (2006), para. 35, or EEA non-delegation of 
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In response to ongoing legal developments, the European Commission Directorate on Circular 
Economy and Green Growth recently issued a note «aimed at clarifying the legal situation and 
outlining the proposed way forward» for the ship recycling regulation in the EU (see Appendix 
A).11 
 
1.1  What is ship recycling  
The process of ship recycling starts with a shipowner that has and end-of-life ship that the owner 
wishes to sell to a recycling yard. The shipowner typically sells the ship to a special-purpose 
company, a so-called ‘cash buyer’, who resells the ship to a ship recycling facility that 
dismantles the ship and makes a profit from selling the recycled materials. The vast majority 
end-of-life ships are sold through cash buyers due to the benefits of employing a special-
purpose company. The shipowner doesn’t have to spend time and resources on facilitating the 
recycling process, nor its resources on costs related to storage, towing and pre-cleaning of the 
ship (see Appendix B). The shipowner is secured payment for the ship as they are paid upfront 
in 100% cash and hence escape the risk of non-fulfilment from the yard. A final benefit is that 
the shipowner to a great extent is relieved of legal liability for the ships’ further voyage where 
the ships’ geographical position or re-registration entail jurisdictional changes, and for the 
manner in which the vessel is ultimately disposed. 
 
Recycling is a word that normally give associations to environmental-friendly practices, and 
the recycling and reuse of the materials of the ship is in itself an effective exploitation of 
resources. However, the ship recycling-process is to a great extent anything but an eco-
sustainable practice. The five great ship recycling countries whose ship recycling activity 
constitute 98 % of the market is India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Turkey and China, and the three 
Southeast Asian countries account for 70-75%.12 
 
Today, the most commonly used method for dismantling ships for their materials is called 
‘beaching’. There is no clear definition of beaching, but the Norwegian Shipowners’ 
Association define it as «recycling of ships without using fixed installations for collection and 
handling of dangerous and polluting wastes».13 Beaching mainly occurs in the Southeast Asian 
countries, at Alang-Sosiya in India, Gadani in Pakistan and Chattogram in Bangladesh, and the 
                                               
11 The note is unpublished, attached in Appendix A; The Directorate requested the note to be shared «with 
experts in charge of implementation […] in your Member States», Appendix A, p. 1. 
12 [51], [72, p. 22]; [36, p. 752]. 
13 [52] translated in [31, p. 7]. 
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method is used in 89.9 % of ship recycling in GT worldwide.14 The quantity of ships that got 
beached in 2018 were 17 million GT.15  
 
When a vessel is beached, it is run aground on the tidal mudflats of a beach where workers on 
the shore, ship breakers, dismantle it manually during low tide. This method creates safety and 
environmental hazards. The job of manually dismantling a beached ship is a precarious 
occupation, 400 workers has lost their lives since 2009 and many more are maimed for life.16 
As ships lie in the intertidal zone when they’re broken apart, the hazardous and environmentally 
harmful materials of the ships soak the ground and is washed directly out into the sea along 
with the tide (See Appendix C). Studies have found significant pollution of the marine 
environment in the vicinity of beaching areas: 
 
«From the findings of the case study, the coastal areas of Bangladesh are strongly 
polluted by Fe, Al, and Hg whereas moderately polluted by Mn, Zn and As and slightly 
by Pb and Cu. Trace elements concentrations i.e. Fe, Mn, Zn, Ni, Cr, Cu, Cd, Pb, As, 
Al and Hg of all seawater samples exceeded the average abundance of elements in the 
standard values of seawater. From the study, it revealed that average concentrations 
(mg/L) of Fe, Al and Hg are respectively high at Chittagong coast».17 
 
The owners of the beaching-yards doesn’t spend much resources on building yards with 
industrial facilities to dispose of the hazardous waste and to secure a safe work environment, 
and the developing countries in which they reside have low wages and contain target markets 
for the ships materials.18 Combined, these factors make the beaching yards very profitable and 
allows them to pay a better price to the cash buyer for an end-of-life-ship than an industrial yard 
in a developed country is able to, generating higher revenues and economic incentives for all 
actors involved in the demolition-sale.19 
 
                                               
14 [33] Note: other sources present different statistics, but as the NGO is a global coalition consisting of 18 
environmental, human rights and labour rights organisations from 10 countries that specialise on unsound ship 
recycling, their statistics are presumed to be the most accurate; Chattogram is the correct name of Chittagong. 
15 17 of 18.9 million GT, [33]. 
16 [55]; Life expectancy for men working as ship breakers in Bangladesh is 20 years lower than Bangladeshi 
men in the general population, [31, p. 6]; An explosion at Gadani beach killed 31 workers and injured 58, 
01/11/2016.  
17 [36, p. 754]; See also Appendix D, Table 1. 
18 80-90% of Bangladesh’s steel is derived through ship recycling, [44, p. 2].  
19 Appendix B. 
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The beaching countries of the Southeast Asian continent used to have very lenient legislation 
that facilitated the rise of Southeast Asia ship recycling havens, but in recent years they have 
adopted legislative acts prescribing both environmental and workforce protection.20 In spite of 
these developments, the countries have poor law enforcement and the beaching industry has 
prevailed.21  
 
One reason for the lack of proper law enforcement is that the Southeast Asian countries struggle 
with widespread corruption. In Transparency Internationals’ corruption index for 2019, India, 
Pakistan and Bangladesh were ranked as 80/198, 120/198 and 140/198, respectively.22 The 
effect of the national level of corruption on the recycling industry is exemplified by an accident 
at a yard in Alang on the 28/04/2020; A worker named Md. Khalil was injured while working 
at an unregistered recycling yard belonging to the Indian legislator Didarul Alam.  
 
1.2 Central considerations – understanding the stakes involved 
As any industry, the ship recycling industry has its own balance of interests that regulators must 
consider diligently. For ship recycling, the most important balance to strike is one that preserves 
the environment, protects human health and sufficiently considers the societal importance of 
the recycling yards in their respective countries and their continued profitability. 
 
Beaching causes major pollution in its surroundings, and working as a ship breaker has been 
described as the most dangerous occupation in the world.23 The vast majority of ships contain 
asbestos, heavy metals, toxic mineral oils and fuels, PAHs, PCBs and organotins such as the 
aggressive biocide TBT (see Appendix C). The peril these volatile materials and substances 
pose is significant, with effects varying from highly explosive, lethal or carcinogenic upon long-
term exposure, to causing male characteristics in female marine snails.24 
 
Another consideration is the future environmental impact. The rising sea level will redistribute 
the metals from its current, relative immobilization in the soil to the marine ecosystem, where 
it could find its way into the food chain through shellfish, similar to the process of microplastics. 
                                               
20 E.g. the Indian Shipbreaking Code of 2013 or the Pakistani « Balochistan Environmental Protection Act» 
of 2012, both of which are replete with stringent norms for safety, monitoring and compliance. Bangladeshi 
workforce protection was strengthened by the Labour Act of 2006.  
21 There are examples of enforcement: Bangladesh High Court Divisions verdict 14/11/2019 on the recycling 
of North Sea Producer (IMO 8124058)/ Indian authorities were in October 2020 on the lookout for tanker J Nat 
(IMO 8100909) containing over 1500 tons of mercury-contaminated wastes, to prevent in beaching in Alang 
[50] and Bangladeshi ship-import ban of 2009-2010. 
22 [54]. 
23 [53] and [74, p. 3]. 
24 [14]; In Bangladesh there was found asbestosis in 35 % of the workers tested, and 80 % reported eye-, 
lung-, gastrointestinal- and musculoskeletal-related symptoms, [47, pp. 2-4]. 
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An IPCC-estimation of the effect of sea level rise on the beaches of Gadani and Chattogram 
suggest that the rising sea levels can cause the submerging of respectively 3500-8100 m3 and 
11000-25000 m3 of polluted sand under the new high tide (see Appendix D, Table 2 and 3). 
The sea level rise could release, inter alia, between 5696,2-13019,9 kg of lead into the marine 
eco system of Chattogram and Gadani combined (see Appendix D, Table 4).25  
 
It is important to note that this estimation is based on IPCCs’ 2007-estimation, projecting a sea 
level rise of 0.21m – 0.78m by 2099. IPCC has since adjusted their projection to a rise between 
0.3m – 1.1m.26 
 
Despite abovementioned hazards for human and environmental health alike, recycling still has 
a prominent environmentally friendly side as it reduces the exhaustion of the planet’s natural 
resources. Ship recycling is a particularly effective industry, recovering up to 98% of the ship 
in weight.27 Taking into account that 18.9 million GT of ships were recycled in 2018 alone, the 
recycled steel from the ships provide an important contribution to the overarching 
environmental goals of circular economy and reduced carbon emissions.28  
 
The societal impact is another central element in this balance of interests. The ship recycling 
yards are big employers, and the Southeast Asian countries have industries that rely heavily on 
materials recovered from ship recycling.29 It is difficult to obtain current employment-statistics, 
but in 2019 it was estimated that the Southeast Asian countries employ 225 000 as ship breakers 
or in ancillary operations, and in 2008 the ILO estimated that 500 000 people in India indirectly 
benefitted from beaching activities.30 Additionally, the yards are important tax payers. In 
Pakistan, the yards contribute with between 5-12 billion Pakistani Rupees (€25 143 419 – 
60 368 551) in taxes annually.31 A societal human rights issue with the yards is that 
approximately 13% of the ship breaking workforce is made up by child labour. 
 
13% of the workers in Bangladesh are child labourers from 15-18 years old, while the age limit 
for hazardous work in Bangladesh is 18 years.32 In lack of recent sources for India and Pakistan, 
                                               
25 Combined numbers of impact. 
26 [56]. 
27 [57, p. 1], significantly more effective compared to aircraft recycling, cf. [18].  
28 [33]; On average 1.9 tonnes of carbon is emitted per tonne of steel produced [66]. 
29 Supra, fn. 18. 
30 225 000, [47, p. 4]. Note that the report is unclear on where the numbers come from; it refers to [44], yet 
that study doesn’t present these numbers. As the report otherwise is thorough, it is assumed to give a correct 
presentation of employment statistics; [13]. 
31 [43, p. 3]. 
32 [48, pp. 10-11]; Cf. the Labour Act of 2006 section 34, 35 and 2(63). 
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this thesis cautiously assume that child labour makes up a similar percentage of their workforce. 
The legal age limits for hazardous work is presumed to be the same for India and Pakistan as 
well, since these age limits are determined by ILO C138, which is ratified by both countries. 
The current amount of child labour is a significant decrease from 2008, when the percentage of 
child labour in the shipbreaking industry of Bangladesh was estimated to be 25%.33 The latter 
study of 2008 found that 10 % of the workforce were children under the age of 12, while the 
2019-study found no workers under the age of 15, and so the age of the child labourers is 
simultaneously increasing as the extent of the child labour decreases. 
. 
Albeit necessary, a stricter regulation of the industry runs the risk of deterring the shipowners, 
and the Southeast Asian countries face an evident conflict of interests.34 The countries are 
heavily dependent on the industry that maims and kills their workers, poisons their population 
and contaminates their soil and waters, for reasons of employment, tax revenue and steel supply. 
Placing restrictions on their industry risk reducing the current incentives for the shipowners to 
dispose of their ships on the beaches of Southeast Asia. Moreover, it would be a costly venture 
to upgrade the 392 shipbreaking plots on the beaches of Alang-Sosiya (120), Gadani (132) and 
Chattogram (140), which in turn could affect the prices and aggravate the economic prospects 
for the countries in question.35 
 
Simultaneously, when a stronger legal framework could prevent shipowners from sending their 
ships to Southeast Asian beaches altogether, the possible deterrence can serve as motivation for 
the countries to comply with achievable standards to maintain their competitiveness.  
 
Conflicting interests challenge global cooperation, which is made pertinent for the 
establishment of a well-functioning regulation of ship recycling by the transnational nature both 
of ships and of the jurisdictions involved. The Flag State rule subject ships exclusively to the 
jurisdiction of its Flag State while on the high seas, and the ship can change its flag to any 
nationality, conditioned that there «exist a genuine link between the State and the ship».36 This 
has led to certain ship registries gaining repute as ‘Flags of Convenience’, used by shipowners 
to re-register their ships to a more lenient jurisdiction when convenient, for example to 
circumvent regulations.37  
                                               
33 [16, p. 15]; [74]. 
34 See Indian Supreme Court-case of 2006-2007 on recycling Blue Lady (IMO 5119143), a highly toxic vessel 
that contained 1250 tons of asbestos-contaminated materials. The Indian authorities denied that ships were 
‘hazardous wastes’ and emphasised the public, economic and environmental benefits of ship recycling, [74, p. 33]. 
35 PHP spent $6m [39]. 
36 UNCLOS art. 91(1)-(2).  
37 Compare blacklist [30] with, infra, fn. 42. 
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As this thesis focus on how these developments impact EU secondary legislation, as well as the 
ECs’ «proposed way forward», the balance of interests should also be considered from a 
European perspective. The EU Commission launched the climate package «the European 
Green Deal» on the 11th of December 2019. Their adopted climate strategy state that:  
«The Commission is of the view that the EU should stop exporting its waste outside of the EU 
and will therefore revisit the rules on waste shipments and illegal exports»38 and the action plan 
announces that «[…] considering that illegal shipments of waste remain a source of concern, 
the Commission will take action with the aim to [sic!] ensure that the EU does not export its 
waste challenges to third countries.»39 
Conversely, the EU regulation policy aim to facilitate export of end-of-life ships to third 
countries. The EU has seemingly not changed its ship recycling policy in accordance with the 
Green Deal action plan, as it is in the process of negotiating an end-of-life ship export agreement 
with India under the EU-India Joint Declaration on Resource Efficiency and Circular Economy 
from July 2020.40 This deviation is closely linked to the EUs’ interests as predominantly a trade 
union working to facilitate favourable trade for its important industries, and as an exporter of 
human rights and environmental awareness. 
 
1.3 Actuality 
The international community and the European community have worked to prevent 
environmentally unsound management of ships for many years through international 
conventions and EU regulations.41 Considering the beaching-numbers from 2018 it can safely 
be stated that their attempts regarding environmentally sound ship recycling has, on account of 
lack of cooperation on enforcement and out-flagging-practices, so far proven unsuccessful.42 
 
Since 2018, the ship recycling legislation has been subjected to substantial legal developments:  
                                               
38 [58, p. 8]. 
39 [59, p. 15]. 
40 Infra, chapter 3. 
41 SOLAS 1959, MARPOL 1973, Bamako Convention 1991, Rotterdam Convention 1994, Stockholm 
Convention 2001.  
42 Tuvalu, St. Kitts-Nevis, Mongolia, St. Vincent and Grenadines, Comoros, Cambodia and Dominica were 
the flag states of approximately 20% of all recycled ships, but less than 2% of ships in service in 2008, [5, p. 52]; 
7.7% GT beached in 2014 were EU-flagged while 32% were under EU beneficial ownership [74, p. 5]; Installing 
higher requirement to the «genuine link» between the ship and the Flag State to prevent out-flagging have been 
attempted, including through the failed UN Convention for Registration of Ships from 1986 (not in force). 
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EU case law has moved towards establishing de facto criminal liability for unsound ship 
recycling practices,43 the Basel Conventions’ Ban Amendment accessioned into international 
law,44 the entry-into-force of the HKC went from being a possibility to becoming a probability 
as it was ratified by Turkey and India,45 and the ESRR is fully entering into force on the 31st of 
December 2020.46 
 
Ship recycling regulation is increasingly relevant as the world fleet is ageing (see Appendix E). 
The situation is exacerbated by COVID-19 economic crisis, as recessionary times can prompt 
increased recycling activity.47 The interconnectedness between the global economy and ship 
recycling has already lead to a rapid increase in recycling of cruise ships in Turkey.48 EU 
regulations have particular impact on ship recycling practices due to the European ownership 
dominance in the world fleet, where European beneficial owners control between 35-40% and 
22% fly a Community flag.49  
 
2 Introduction to the legal landscape 
This chapter will briefly introduce the Basel Convention and the ESRR, and the friction 
between them. The legal frameworks are of different levels and nature of governance, and 
different rules of interpretation applies to international treaties and to EU secondary legislation. 
Where the rules on the interpretation of international treaty law provide for a high level of 
sovereignty, the same does not apply to EU secondary law as the EU Member States have 
conceded legislative power and a certain extent of their sovereignty to the Union.50 
Consequentially, the Basel Convention is subject to strict treaty-interpretation, while the 
interpretation of EU legislation will be affected by auxiliary EU law, Community case law and 
guidelines issued by the Commission. 
 
2.1 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969/1986 
International customary treaty law is codified through the Vienna Conventions of 1969 and 
1986.51 Notwithstanding that the EU is Party to neither of the VCLT, it is accepted that the 
                                               
43 Infra, subchapter 4.1.1. 
44 Infra, subchapter 3.2.2.  
45 January and November of 2019 respectively. The ratification of two big ship recycling nations significantly 
increases the likelihood of that convention entering into force, supra fn. 8. 
46 ESRR art. 32(2)(b). 
47 [60, p. 683]; [61]; [63]. 
48 [64] 
49 [74, p. 3], compare to [77]. 
50 Mutatis mutandis for EEA, supra, fn. 10. 
51 The VCLT-69 only «applies to treaties between States» directly, cf. art. 1. 
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principles of customary international law that are codified in the VCLT are applicable to the 
EU.52 
 
The general rule of treaty interpretation is codified in VCLT article 31. In accordance with 
article 31, the Basel Convention «shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the 
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in light of its object 
and purpose», taking into account «any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding 
the interpretation […] or the application of its provisions; any subsequent practice in the 
application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its 
interpretation».53 The treaty’s interpretative factors may be supplemented by, inter alia, «the 
circumstances of its conclusion» where the initial interpretation «leaves the meaning 
ambiguous».54 
 
2.2 The beginning of regulatory regimes on transboundary waste management  
The Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous waste and 
their Disposal of 1989 entered into force in 1992 is today signed by 187 Parties.55 The 
Convention was arranged by UNEP as a response to increased export of hazardous waste, ‘toxic 
trade’, from industrialised to non-industrialised countries. The toxic trade followed an increased 
environmental awareness- and regulation in developed countries and the «not in my back yard»-
syndrome, which made it more profitable to export waste to countries where environmental 
awareness was less developed and environmental laws had yet to be made and sufficiently 
enforced. The toxic trade lead to a public outcry, and the Basel Convention was made to combat 
the problem.56 In the preamble of the Convention, the parties declare themselves:  
«Aware of the risk of damage to human health and the environment caused by hazardous 
wastes and other wastes and the transboundary movement thereof,» 
and state their determination to: 
                                               
52 Part 3, para. 11 [23] and [49, pp. 11-13]; Principles of international customary law is accepted by CJEU, 
cf. Case-432/92 (1994) para. 43; Case C-268/99 (2001) para. 35; Case C-432/92 (1994), paras 43, 50; Case 
C25/94 (1996), para. 33; Case C-158/91 (1993); Case C-327/91 (1994), para 25. 
53 VCLT-69 art. 31(1) & 31(3)(a)-(b).  
54 VCLT-69 art. 32(a). 
55 It is notable that the US and Haiti are the only signatories that have not ratified the Convention.  
56 [75]. 
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«protect, by strict control, human health and the environment against the adverse effects 
which may result from the generation and management of hazardous wastes and other 
wastes».57 
The preamble identifies three tactics to resolve the problem of toxic trade: Reduction of 
generation of hazardous wastes,58 reduction of transboundary waste-movement,59 and to allow 
transboundary waste-movement only when the transport and ultimate disposal is 
environmentally sound. It is the latter element, realised through «prior informed consent»60 
procedures and «environmentally sound management» provisions,61 that directly relates to the 
ship recycling industry.  
2.2.1 The scope of the Basel Convention and its applicability to ship recycling 
The Convention applies to export, transit or import of waste, and the Parties are prohibited from 
engaging in waste import or export with countries that are not Party to the Convention.62 The 
prohibition entails that the Conventions’ stipulations are fully applicable to all export, transit 
and import related to ship recycling within the geographical jurisdictions of the contracting 
Parties. The Convention is public international law that the Parties are required to implement 
the Conventions’ provisions in their national public and private law to fulfil their obligations 
as Parties.63 
 
The Convention applies to transboundary movements of ‘wastes’, and ‘hazardous wastes’. 
Waste is defined in the Convention article 2(1) as any «substances or objects which are 
disposed of […] intended to be […] or are required to be disposed of», through operations 
listed in the Convention Annex IV.64 Recycling is a recovery operation as defined in the Annex 
IV, and ships that are destined for recycling are accordingly ‘wastes’ within the Basel regime.65 
A ship is classified as waste from the point in time when the intention to recycle the ship 
manifests itself.66  
 
                                               
57 Preamble (1) and (24). 
58 Art. 4(2)(a). 
59 Art. 4(2)(b), (d). 
60 Art. 4(1) and art. 4(2)(f). Specifically prescribed in art. 6; See also the Rotterdam Convention. 
61 Art. 4(2)(c)-(h), Cf. art. 2(8). 
62 Art. 4(5). 
63 Art. 4(4). 
64 Art. 2(1), cf. 2(4). 
65 Annex IVB. For art. 2(1), it was confirmed that a ship could be ‘waste’ in Decision VII//26 of the 7th CoP, 
which, by force of being a subsequent agreement between the Parties, is applicable to the interpretation of the 
Convention text, Cf. VCLT-69 art. 31(3)(a).  
66 In what manner such intent must be manifested is outside the scope of this thesis. 
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A ship intended for recycling is classified as ‘hazardous wastes’ if the vessel «having as 
constituents» any of the substances or materials as listed in Annex I, «unless they do not possess 
any of the characteristics contained in Annex III».67 As shown in chapter 1, most ships have 
such constituents and do possess the characteristics of Annex III.68 In addition, wastes that are 
considered hazardous by domestic legislation in a Party involved in the transport, shall be 
treated as hazardous wastes.69 
 
Waste discharge that «derive from the normal operations of a ship», is excluded from the scope 
of the Basel regime when the discharge in question is regulated by other international 
instruments.70 A ship is obviously not derived from its own operation, and ships that have 
become ‘waste’ can thereby not be excluded under this exemption. Aside from the letter of the 
Convention, this matter is clearly settled by the subsequent agreement Decision VII/26.71 
 
2.2.2 The Basel Ban Amendment  
The Basel Ban Amendment in article 4A was adopted by the 3d CoP, in recognition of «[…] 
that transboundary movements of hazardous wastes, especially to developing countries, have a 
high risk of not constituting an [ESM] […] as required by this Convention».72 The Amendment 
completed its ratification process 24 years after its adoption, and entered into force on the 5th 
of December 2019 ratified by 99 Parties, including the EU.73 Article 4A(2) provide that:74 
 
«Each Party listed in Annex VII shall [...] prohibit [...] all transboundary movements of 
hazardous wastes under Article 1(1)(a) of the Convention which are destined for operations 
according to Annex IV B to States not listed in Annex VII […]»  
The amendment is a complete ban on export of hazardous wastes from Parties to the 
Amendment «listed in Annex VII», hereinafter ‘OECD+ countries’, destined for recovery 
operations in non-OECD+ countries.75 In addition to applicability for Parties to the 
                                               
67 Basel art. 1(1)(a). 
68 Compare Appendix C to Convention Annex I, and the perils of beaching for human health and the 
environment in Chapter 1 to Annex III. 
69 Basel art. 1(1)(b). 
70 Basel art. 1(4); cumulative criteria, referring to MARPOL, cf. [24] para. 58. 
71 VCLT-69 art. 31(3)(a) cf. 7th CoP decision VII//26 «many ships […] are known to contain hazardous 
materials» and may «become hazardous wastes». 
72 Convention preamble (7) bis. 
73 Annex VII. 
74 Non-recovery operations are regulated in art. 4A(1), recovery operations in 4A(2), Cf. Annex IVA and B. 
75 4A(2) only applies to ‘hazardous wastes’, exclusively defined in art. 1(1)(a). The same limitation is not 
imposed in 4A(1), applicable for all ‘wastes’; OECD Members, EU, Lichtenstein. 
 20 
Amendment, the ban applies indirectly to all transboundary movements where eighter the 
importing or exporting country has ratified the Ban Amendment. 
The indirect effect for Parties that have not ratified the Amendment come from the general 
obligations and PIC-procedures that all Parties to the Convention must adhere to. For an 
exporting Party, the indirect effect follow the general obligation for Parties to «prohibit […] the 
export […] to the Parties which have prohibited the import of such wastes».76 For an importing 
Party, the PIC-procedure require that «The State of [import] shall not allow […] the 
transboundary movement until it has received […] written consent from the State of [export]».77 
 
Violations of the Ban Amendment constitute «illegal traffic» which is a «criminal» act 
subjected to penal sanctions.78  
 
The EUs’ transposition of the Convention is the EWSR, applicable to transnational waste-
shipments taking place in Community territory.79 The EWSR definition of ‘wastes’ is made by 
referral to WFD Annex I and II.80 Ships’ classification as waste is expressed through WFD art. 
3(15) and article 4.81 
 
While the Ban Amendment may be a new feature to the Convention, the EU has imposed the 
Basel Ban since 1997, and article 4A(2) is currently implemented through EWSR article 36.82 
The ban applies to waste-exports from the Community «destined for recovery in countries to 
which the OECD decision does not apply», if the waste has hazardous characteristics as listed 
in litra (a)-(e).83 Illegal traffic is criminalised through the ECD.84 
 
                                               
76 Art. 4(1)(b). 
77 Art. 6(3) cf. art. 6(5)(b). 
78 Art. 9(1)(b) cf. 4(3)-(4). 
79 EWSR art. 1(2). Excluded shipments are exhaustively listed in art. 1(3)-(5). 
80 EWSR art. 2(1), cf. WFD art. 3(1), (previously Directive 2006/12/EC art. 1(1)(a)), cf. 3(15) and 3(19); For 
‘waste’, the «actual intention» of the holder is given decisive significance, cf. CJEU Case C-C421/12, para. 49.  
81 EWSR preamble (35); EWSR art. 2(2) defines ‘hazardous wastes’ through referral to Directive 91/689/EEC 
art. 1(4), a directive that was repealed the 11th of December 2010 by WFD art. 41. According to art. 41, the repealed 
Directive art. 1(4) is replaced by «waste featuring on the list established by Commission Decision 2000/532/EC 
on the basis of Annexes I and II to this Directive» that «have one or more of the properties listed in Annex III». 
The Decision 2000/532/EC was amended to Decision 2014/955/EU. The decision contains a substantial list of 
wastes subject to the test of hazardous properties in WFD Annex III, and specified limit values for certain 
substances or materials (additional to the cut-off values in WFD Annex III). The 2014-decision conferred by WFD 
Annex III is the applicable definition of ‘hazardous wastes’ in the EWSR, without prejudice to the list in EWSR 
Annex V. 
82Previously Regulation 259/93/EEC amended by Regulation 120/97/EC; art. 34 address disposal-operations.  
83 Refers to OECD Decision C(2001)107/Final, also referred to as ‘OECD+ countries’. 
84 EWSR art. 2(35)(f) cf. art. 50(1) cf. ECD art. 3(c). 
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After the accession of the Ban Amendment, ships are banned from being exported out of the 
Community for purposes of recycling in non-OECD+-countries by power of public 
international law.  
 
2.3 European Ship Recycling Regulation 1257/2013 
The ESRR aims toward « facilitating early ratification» of the HKC in the Community and in 
third countries through introducing EU regulation «on basis of that Convention».85 The 
Regulation applies Flag State and Port State jurisdiction, covering ships of no less than 500 GT 
whose flag state is in the Community.86 
 
The objective of the Regulation is «namely to prevent, reduce or eliminate adverse effects […] 
caused by the recycling […] of ships flying the flag of a Member State»,87 acknowledging that 
its functionality is limited «to the extent that re-flagging to avoid EU jurisdiction does not 
occur».88 To «reduce disparities between operators in the Union, in OECD countries and in 
relevant third countries» and «avoid duplication», the preamble of ESRR consider it 
«necessary to exclude ships […] falling under the scope of this Regulation» from the EWSR 
and the WFD.89 The scope of EWSR has consequentially been amended.90 
 
In recognition of the Basel regimes’ shortcomings relating to «the specificities of ships and 
international shipping»,91 the ESRR restrict the use- and require an inventory of hazardous 
materials in ships,92 contain provisions for shipowners, recycling facilities and their host 
countries and Flag States on ship preparations, inspections and certificates ahead of a recycling-
operation,93 and specified procedures and technical standards for the recycling facilities.94 
Technical guidelines issued by the Commission «in order to facilitate» the approval recycling 
facilities in third countries function as specified requirements rather than as ‘recommended but 
                                               
85 See analysis of HKC [60]; ESRR preamble (5). 
86 Cf. ESRR art. 2. ESRR does not apply to Community flagged ships that has operated solely within its flag 
states territorial waters, cf. art. 2(2)(c), nor to warships, naval auxiliary, or ships owned or operated by a state for 
non-commercial purposes, cf. art. 2(2)(a). The ESRR art. 12 has an additional geographical jurisdiction, 
including ships flagged to third countries when they call at a port or anchorage within Community territory, cf. 
art. 2(1). 
87 Preamble (22). 
88 [29, p. 8]. 
89 Preamble (7) and (10); Infra, chapter 3. 
90 EWSR art. 1(3)(i). WFD allow specifying legislation for «particular instances […] on the management of 
particular categories of waste» through «individual Directives», cf. art. 2(4). The ESRR only override WFD in 
certain articles, «particular instances», although not a Directive. 
91 Preamble (2), referring to the Basel non-binding ship recycling guidelines, cf. 6th CoP Decision VI/24. 
92 Art. 4, art. 5. 
93 Art. 6-10. 
94 Art. 13-15. 
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optional’ practices, as they are instructive on how to gain necessary approval from the 
Commission.95 
 
The ESRR allow ships to be recycled at any yard listed in the European List of Ship Recycling 
Facilities.96 Community facilities shall be authorised and added to the EU-list if they are 
compliant with the requirements of article 13, while facilities in «third countries» may apply 
for inclusion.97 The ESRR makes no reservation for applications from facilities in non-OECD+ 
countries, and so the text of the Regulation allow for export of end-of-life ships to non-OECD+ 
countries, insofar as the destination-facility meet the criteria in article 15.  
 
3 An article 11 comparative analysis of the EU strategy 
The legality of the ESRR-system was a controversial matter already before the Ban Amendment 
entered into force,98 and the legality has again been questioned in light of the binding force of 
the Basel Ban Amendment as public international law.99 The access for non-OECD+ yards to 
the EU-list is in contradiction of the Ban Amendment, while the Convention declares that «no 
reservation or exception may be made to this Convention».100 This chapter will analyse the 
legality of the ESRR in light of the EU’s obligations under public international law.  
 
A third, but minor, point of conflict stems from a formulation in the ESRR preamble, stating 
that «Ships neither covered by the Hong Kong Convention nor by this Regulation […] should 
continue to be subject to [EWSR] and to [WFD] and [ECD]».101 The formulation display an 
intention to allow also vessels covered by HKC and not by the ESRR, to be exempt from the 
WFD and the criminal liability for EWSR-violations in ECD.102 Preamble recitals have no legal 
force independently, but is nevertheless noteworthy both as a reflection of EU policy and as it 
seemingly is the defence in the EWSR-based investigations of Eimskip and Teekay Offshore.103 
                                               
95 Art. 15(4) §3; See application in [1], [2] of EUTG, [32]. 
96 Art. 6(2)(a) cf. Art. 16; See controversy on the EU-lists’ recycling capacity [76]. 
97 ESRR art. 13-15. 
98 The friction between the Convention and ESRR rise from the fact that the EU excluded ESRR-ships from 
the EWSR [26], [69] contra [29]; The frameworks apply different regulatory structures, which Krämer argues 
could be simultaneously applied after minor adjustments [69], para. 34. 
99 [26], [25] and [17]. 
100 Basel art. 26. 
101 Preamble (10). 
102 Illegal waste traffic is criminalised in Directive 2008/99/EC art. 3(c), cf. EWSR art. 2(35). 
103 Eimskip is under investigation for demolition-sales of Goodafoss (IMO 9086796) and Laxfoss (IMO 
9086801). Teekay is under investigation for Navion Britannia (IMO 9145188). Interestingly, the demolition sales 
of Teekay-ships Alexita Spirit (IMO 9152507), sold for approx. $9 million in April 2019, beached in Alang 
06.05.2019), Navion Scandia (IMO 9168934), sold for $10.8 million in November 2018 beached in Chittagong 
16.02.2019), and Nordic Spirit (IMO 9208045), sold for approx. $9 million in April 2019 beached in Alang 
01.06.2019) are not part of the investigation, despite being within the same jurisdiction, [67], [68]. Both companies 
claim the sales under investigation were compliant with EU law since the yards are so-called ‘Hong Kong 
certified’, infra, subchapter 4.2. 
 23 
 
3.1 The EU’s assessment of the implications of the Ban Amendment on the 
ESRR and the Commissions «proposed way forward» 
 
The Convention opens up for regulatory structures that deviate from the Convention text in 
article 11(1): 
 
«Notwithstanding the provisions of article 4 paragraph 5, Parties may enter into 
bilateral, multilateral, or regional agreements or arrangements regarding 
transboundary movement of hazardous wastes or other wastes […] with Parties or non-
Parties provided that such agreements or arrangements do not derogate from the 
environmentally sound management of hazardous wastes […] required by this 
Convention. These agreements […] shall stipulate provisions which are not less 
environmentally sound than those provided for by this Convention in particular taking 
into account the interests of developing countries». 
 
A cardinal rule of the VCLT, pacta sunt servanda, uphold the principle that «every treaty in 
force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith».104  
 
The applicability of article 11 to the Ban Amendment once in force was examined by the EU 
in 1995. The matter was discussed by the Council of Ministers of the Environment in October 
1995, concluding that article 11 could not be applied in relation to article 4A.105 Their position 
was affirmed by the EU Head of the Waste Management Unit, stating that «any derogation 
from the general obligation of Article 4A by way of [article 11] would be a violation of the 
spirit and the provisions of the Convention».106 In 2012, the EU Legal Service issued an opinion 
in which they recognize the «difficulty» of relying on article 11 «as regards to the Ban 
Amendment […] particularly in the absence of any appropriate interpretative Decision of the 
Basel Convention COP».107  
 
                                               
104 VCLT-69 art. 26; The rule has been recognised as binding upon the EU by the CJEU: Case 104/81 
(1982), ECR-3641 para. 18, regarding the EEC, Portugal and GATT 1947, the court confirm that «According to 
the general rules of international law there must be bona fide performance of every agreement»; Case C-61/94 
(1996) I-3989 para. 30, the court refer to «the general rule of international law requiring the parties to any 
agreement to show good faith in its performance» when interpreting the International Dairy Agreement. 
105 [45, p. 2]. 
106 Para. 4 [45]. 
107 [29, p. 13]. 
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The Commission conducted a new article 11-analysis of the ESRR in relation to the entry-into-
force of Ban Amendment in October 2020, and reached the following conclusions:  
 
(1) no recycling yard situated in a non-OECD+ country can be accepted to the EU-list before 
the EU has concluded a ship recycling-agreement with the third country in question, (2) an 
agreement between the EU and the third country can make the ESRR-system article 11-
compliant, and (3) insofar as no yard in a non-OECD+ country is on the EU-list, the theoretical 
possibility of such an inclusion does not in itself constitute a violation of the Basel Ban 
Amendment.108 
 
The Commission consider the ESRR-regime to be performance in good faith of the EUs 
obligations under the Basel Convention, and is in the process of establishing a trade-agreement 
with India, through which the EU aim to facilitate export of end-of-life ships. The envisioned 
arrangement consists of three pillars: the ESRR, domestic ship recycling-regulation in India, 
and a ship recycling export agreement under the newly established India-EU Resource 
Efficiency and Circular Economy Partnership.109 
 
3.2 Treaty interpretation of article 11 
Access to deviate from the Convention through article 11 is conditioned by four cumulative 
criteria.  
 
The first criterion identifies the valid legal instruments. The deviation must be conducted 
through «bilateral, multilateral, or regional agreements or arrangements». The second 
criterion clarify the scope; the object of the arrangement must be concerning «transboundary 
movement» of wastes between the contracting Parties to the arrangement. 
 
The third criterion is that the arrangement does «not derogate from the environmentally sound 
management» of wastes as required by the Convention. The ordinary meaning of derogation is 
defined as «partial repeal of a law, usually by a subsequent act that in some way diminishes its 
original intent or scope»; to «enact something that is contrary to it»; and «an exception from a 
rule of law».110 The Convention rules on waste management must not be repealed, diminished, 
contradicted or granted exceptions by the agreement. This criterion is limited to regulate only 
                                               
108 Appendix A, pp. 7-8. 
109 Appendix A, para. 7 and 22-25; «EU-India Joint Declaration on Resource Efficiency and Circular 
Economy». 
110 Definitions from [34], [40], [27]. 
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provisions on waste management, thereby allowing for derogation of other rules, such as 
notification procedures or dispute mechanisms. Considering the specific exception, 
«notwithstanding the provisions of article 4 paragraph 5» which regulate with whom a Party 
may engage in waste import or export, it is reasonable to interpret import and export as ‘waste 
management’ in the context of article 11.111 This understanding is strengthened by the fact that 
physical movement of waste is a quite literal management of said waste, furthermore as ‘control 
over transboundary movement of waste’ and «protect, by strict control» the ‘ESM of waste’ 
constitute the object and purpose of the Basel Convention, respectively.112 The fact that the 
object of an article 11-arrangement is transboundary waste-movement does not contradict this 
interpretation, as any trade-arrangement would have ancillary provisions on notification 
procedures, etc.  
 
Finally, the arrangement «shall stipulate provisions which are not less environmentally sound» 
than those of the Convention, particularly accounting for «the interests of developing 
countries». The last criterion relates to any provision, on waste-management or otherwise. This 
threshold of environmental soundness is directly linked to «the interests» of developing 
countries, implying that the environmental interests of developing countries is the main, 
although perhaps not the singular, focus of particular consideration. 
 
Aside from the treaty-text, subsequent agreements and practices between the Parties are central 
interpretative factors, such as CoP Decisions. Lacking «any subsequent agreement regarding 
the interpretation», the «subsequent practice in the application» of article 11 is utilised as an 
interpretative factor.113 
 
Practice has been established through CoP decisions and deliberations on the relationship 
between the Basel Convention and the HKC. The Parties refer to article 11 as a question of 
whether the agreement or arrangement establishes an «equivalent level of control» and 
«enforcement» as the Basel Convention.114 Assessment of ‘article 11-equivalency’ is a practice 
between the Parties and its content has not been further deliberated in a separate decision, which 
in turn reduce its weight as an interpretative factor. 
 
                                               
111 If not, the specific exception of article 4(5) would be superfluous. VCLT-69 art. 31(1). 
112 Preamble (24), Cf. VLCT-69 art. 31(2). 
113 VCLT-69 art. 31(2)(a)-(b). 
114 «Equivalent level of control» cf. 7th CoP Decision VII/26; 8th CoP Decision VIII/11; 9th CoP Decision IX/30; 
10th CoP Decision X/17; «A level of control and enforcement equivalent to that provided under the Basel 
Convention», cf. 11th CoP deliberation, pt. 2 p. 21. 
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«In light of the object and purpose» as presented in the Convention title, the equivalency-
reference is understood to be control over «the transboundary movement» and control over the 
«disposal» of an object or substance from the point in time when it becomes «wastes».115 
Although the Convention to some extent concern itself with the process before something 
becomes waste through provisions on reduced waste-production, these are given significantly 
less focus than waste-management in the Convention text. Control with waste-production is a 
secondary objective, and is accordingly given less importance in the interpretation of the term. 
 
The context of how the term is used, as a referral to the deviation-access in article 11 as a whole, 
signal that ensuring equivalency in level of control and enforcement is the purpose of the 
articles’ criteria. A second understanding of the term is that it refers to an assessment that 
replaces the criteria in article 11. The term could reasonable be understood as a precision of the 
criterion «no less environmentally sound», but if the term should replace the criterion «do not 
derogate», that would significantly alter the meaning of article 11. Considering that the term 
has not been explicitly deliberated by the Parties, nor stem from a subsequent agreement 
between them, the basis of the term is inadequate to replace, repeal or significantly alter the 
interpretation of the Convention text. The term is understood as a complimentary overarching 
assessment. 
 
The meaning of «equivalent level of control and enforcement» is still is left ambiguous, and the 
context of its conclusion with the NIMBY-phenomenon and toxic trade, acts as a supplementary 
interpretative factor.116 The term is therefore interpreted as an overarching requirement of 
equivalent level of enforcement and control over transboundary movement and control over 
disposal in order to prevent toxic trade in wastes. 
 
3.2.1 The applicability of article 11 to the Ban Amendment in article 4A 
According to the interpretation of the treaty-text, no article 11-arrangement can repeal, 
diminish, contradict or grant exceptions to the Convention rules on waste management, 
hereunder export. The Ban Amendment regulate waste-management through export, and an 
arrangement seeking to lift the Ban for recycling of ESRR-ships is clearly to grant an exception 
from the export-ban «required» by the Convention article 4A(2). The arrangement would 
«derogate» from the Conventions’ Ban Amendment in every «ordinary meaning» of the term, 
                                               
115 Convention title, cf. art. 2(1); VCLT-69 art. 31(1). 
116 VCLT-69 art. 32(a). 
 27 
and is therefore unable to fulfil the criteria of article 11.117 As the article is inapplicable in 
relation to the Ban Amendment, no additional equivalency-assessment can be made.  
 
The text of the treaty does not allow for the creation of an arrangement that circumvent the Ban 
Amendment and indeed the EU themselves deemed such an arrangement to be «unacceptable 
from a legal point of view».118  
 
The conclusion is that article 11 cannot be applied in relation to the Ban Amendment in article 
4A, and the exclusion of ESRR-ships from the EWSR is a violation of the Basel Convention. 
 
3.3 Equivalent level of control and enforcement 
On account of the Amendments’ accession and the HKC-related legal developments, there is a 
pressing need for the 15th Basel CoP in July 2021 to clarify the relationship between article 4A 
and article 11 and how this relates to the coming regime of HKC-legislation. This analysis 
continues under the pretence that the CoP issues a Decision that explicitly accept such 
applicability of article 11 where the arrangement or agreement provide an equivalent level of 
control and enforcement as the Convention.119 
 
The EU seemingly consider article 11-equivalency in both ESRR and Indian domestic law a 
necessity for its envisioned arrangement, while expressing uncertainty as to whether «the Indian 
regime satisfies the conditions of Article 11».120 While the need for equivalency in both 
legislations may not be a condition for establishing an article 11-arrangement, the analysis will 
base itself on the EUs’ strategy and understanding.  
 
3.3.1 ESRR and article 11-equivalency 
The first question is if the ESRR provide an equivalent level of control and enforcement as the 
Convention. 
 
Among the previously mentioned dissertations, CIEL present the argument that «an agreement 
facilitating an activity the parties have deemed to be so risky as to require a complete ban 
absolutely cannot be argued to provide an equivalent level of control to that ban».121 The Ban 
                                               
117 VCLT-69 art. 31(1). 
118 [45, p. 1]; Also 2012-opinion stressed the need for interpretative CoP Decision, implying the opinion that 
the text of article 11 itself does not allow for application to the Ban Amendment, supra, subchapter 3.1. 
119 Based on list of potentially relevant assessment-criteria in «Annex to OEWG-V11/12». 
120 [3], para. 21-24. 
121 [25, p. 7]. 
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Amendment was adopted in recognition of that export of hazardous wastes to non-OECD+ 
countries «have a high risk of not constituting an [ESM] of hazardous wastes as required by 
the Basel Convention».122 Although this rationale was based on circumstances 25 years ago and 
the ship recycling industry has seen improvements in that time, the prominent obstacles of poor 
enforcement and widespread corruption causing this «high risk» is still present in developing 
countries.123 Prima facie, CIEL make a valid point considering the reasoning behind the Ban. 
However, a new regulation may instil more practicable rules of control resulting in reduced 
circumvention and better environmental protection, and the actual provisions on control and 
enforcement must be assessed closer before such a conclusion can be made. 
 
An issue raised in all dissertations, is that while the Convention provisions include rules of 
ESM of waste through the entire waste stream, downstream management of hazardous waste is 
outside the scope of the ESRR. This difference in scope is due to the nature of the ESRR as EU 
secondary legislation whose jurisdiction is limited to the Community, while an international 
convention is granted applicability within the jurisdictions of all its Parties. Still, the criticism 
in the dissertations is a misrepresentation of the ESRR-control over DWM. While the ESRR 
may not have direct jurisdiction over DWM in third countries, it requires that an application to 
the EU-list provide «evidence that the [DWM] will be carried out without endangering human 
health and in an environmentally sound manner».124 The inspection-procedure of each yard and 
the demand for evidence of environmentally sound DWM is not found in the Convention, and 
the ESRR grant a higher level of control in that aspect, particularly considering the central 
position of the their guidelines.125 While the EU may seek to exclude ships from the 
Convention, the EU does not have the power to exclude ships from the Convention for the sake 
of third countries, who are bound by the Conventions DWM-provisions irrespective of EU 
policy. Should the yard employ unsound DWM, the Commission can respond by not accepting 
or by removing yards that do not comply with their standards.  
 
The ESRR give more control to the EU over the soundness of downstream management of 
hazardous wastes and is more than equivalent to the Convention, at least when considered 
isolated from other control- and enforcement mechanisms. 
 
                                               
122 2nd CoP Decision II/12. 
123 Supra, subchapter 1.2; Shortcomings of ESM-compliance, supra fn. 34, infra fn. 128-130 and 139, [73, pp. 
174-176], and PIC-procedure [73, pp. 173-174]. 
124 ESRR art. 15(2)(f)(ii). 
125 Supra, fn. 95. 
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The CoP is in disagreement on the topic of the HKC and article 11-equivalency. The 
disagreement holds some relevance to the matter of ESRR and article 11 as the ESRR is based 
on the Hong Kong Convention, but this can only be given a minimum of weight since the 
Regulation applies higher standards than the HKC.126  
 
The ESRR-stipulations does not allow for beaching, as they require that «the ship recycling 
facility [….] operated in a safe and environmentally sound manner […] from built structures» 
ensuring «containment of all hazardous materials […] during the entire ship recycling process 
so at to prevent any release […] into the environment» while any hazardous wastes is handled 
«only on impermeable floors with effective drainage systems».127 In comparison, the Basel 
Convention prevent beaching through the Ban Amendment, but ascertain very little control over 
the recycling process in general. 
 
The Convention instruct the Parties to abide by the relative size of «environmentally sound 
management», while the guidelines specifying what such management might entail are non-
binding.128 The Convention text left the extrapolation of the vague ESM-term to national 
discretion of the Parties, and limited the ESM-obligations to «taking all practicable steps», 
which in good faith must be interpreted as an intentional act from the Parties.129 Still, the ESM-
term is a central principle in the Convention and must have at least some material content, a 
minimum of environmental protection, reducing its relativity to some unknown extent.130  
 
ESM of waste in third countries must according to the ESRR be «broadly equivalent to […] 
Union standards».131 The EU standard of waste-management is found in WFD article 4.132 In 
                                               
126 10th CoP, decision X/17; [29], para. 21; Note that both predates the Ban Amendment, and that the EU 
position is modified accordingly; ESRR art. 13(1)(c), 13(1)(f), 13(1)(g)(i), 13(1)(h) and art. 15(5) differ from 
HKC. 
127 ESRR art. 13(1); (c), (d) and (g)(i), cf. art. 13(1)(f) and EUTG. 
128 The vague obligation of ESM «means taking all practicable steps to ensure [wastes] are managed in a 
manner which will protect human health and the environment against the adverse effects» in an OECD+ country, 
supplemented by non-binding guidelines, infra, fn. 130, Cf. Basel Convention art. 2(8) cf. 4A. 
129 Convention art. 2(8); Placing limitations on a Partys’ sovereignty beyond what the Parties strictly speaking 
have agreed to relinquish, eighter through the original Treaty or subsequent agreements violate «good faith» and 
the principle of sovereignty, VCLT-69 preamble (6). 
130 Beaching-practices labelled «the insufficiencies» in BCTG pt.1§2; Absence of a CoP Decision on the 
question of beaching can constitute ESM could be interpreted as a conscious choice by the Parties; the Indian Code 
list beaching as a legitimate recycling-operation, cf. Section 2(xv); Beaching is briefly mentioned in 10th CoP 
Table 3(B)(3), Activity 31: «develop a feasibility study to identify cost-effective alternatives to the beaching 
method». 
131 ESRR art. 15(5). 
132 Applicable law within the Community and also for EWSR-shipments of waste to third countries, cf. EWSR 
art. 49(1) (WFD previously 2006/12/EC).  
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article 4(2) there is a referral to act in accordance with Directive article 13, which obliges the 
Community to conduct: 
 
«waste management […] (a) without risk to water, air, soil or plants; (b) without 
causing a nuisance through noise or odours; and (c) without adversely affecting the 
countryside or places of special interest».  
 
The ESRR standards are more stringent than the Convention and provide a higher standard of 
ship recycling both within and outside the OECD+ countries, if they are complied with. 
Nevertheless, the assessment is not of which framework provide the most detailed rules, it is of 
equivalent level of enforcement and control over transboundary movement and control over 
disposal in order to prevent toxic trade in wastes. The problem remains that control over the 
transboundary movement itself is not the subject of the ESRR, and this is where the real 
problematics of equivalency arise. 
 
The ESRR jurisdiction is based on territorial Port State Control in the Community and 
extraterritorial Flag State jurisdiction. The Port State Control may inspect ships in accordance 
with PSTD, but the inspection «shall be limited to» the ships’ IHM, recycling-certificates and 
IHM-procedures.133 The Port State Control may only detain a vessel «in the event that it fails 
to submit […] a copy of the inventory certificate or the ready for recycling certificate», while 
failure to carry an updated IHM «shall not constitute a detainable deficiency».134 To adjust for 
lack of extraterritorial control beyond EU-flagged ships, the ESRR reserves the right for the 
Commission to conduct site inspections on EU-listed yard situated in third countries, and 
require that midterm-reviews are carried out every 2.5 year to verify compliance with article 
13.135 
 
The result is that all export or transit states within the Community must allow any ship headed 
to an EU-listed yard with its documentation in order to continue to a yard whose compliance is 
verified on a less than biannual basis. Despite the Commissions’ inspection access, this is a 
very low level of control for the Sates in comparison with the authority of the exporting, transit 
and importing States of the Convention article 4(2)(e), instructing States to take «appropriate 
                                               
133 ; Directive 2009/16/EC; ESRR art. 11(1)-(3). 
134 ESRR art. 11(3). 
135 ESRR art. 15(4)(1)-(2). 
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measures to […] not allow export […] if it has reason to believe that the wastes […] will not 
be managed in an [ESM]».136 
 
The Convention does not mention Port State Control since it regulates general waste 
movements, but the authority given to the Competent Authority is the same where the waste-
shipment is in an exporting, transit or importing Party’s territorial waters. The Convention 
authority is exercised by environmental directorates rather than a Port State Control-inspector, 
but that is not a matter of whether the State has such authority, but of delegation. Although 
nothing in the ESRR prevent Community States from individually continuing to exercise a 
higher level of control through their directorates, this control would be shifted from obligatory 
to voluntarily. The ESRR is thereby a more lenient legislation. 
Another issue of control in the ESRR-system is the procedure of approving ship recycling-
plans. A vessel cannot be recycled before the ship-specific recycling plan issued by the yard is 
approved by the local Competent Authority. However, «tacit approval shall be deemed given, 
if no written objection to the ship recycling plan is communicated […] within a review period 
laid down in accordance with the requirements of the state where the ship recycling facility is 
located».137 The review period is vulnerable to be exceeded due to unpredictable factors such 
as administrative burden, particularly in India where this review period is fifteen days.138 Tacit 
approval grants effectiveness at the expense of control, especially as exporting or transit States 
are initially prevented from intervening if they suspect unsound waste-management.139 In stark 
contrast, tacit approval is in the Conventions PIC-procedure reserved to transit States, and then 
only after a sixty days review period, while exporting and importing States must give written 
consent to waste shipments.140 The ESRR approval-process ahead of ship recycling operations 
provide a significantly lower level of control than the Basel PIC-procedure. 
The ESRR enforcement-stipulations deviate from the Convention both in preventive measures 
to prohibit an unlawful ship recycling operation to occur, and in the prescription of sanctions 
for violations. 
 
                                               
136 See Convention art. 4(2)(f)-(g) and art. 4(5). 
137 ESRR art. 7(3)(3) 
138 The Act art. 17(3) and 20(3). 
139 The Competent Authority over Indian yards, GMB, describe Alang as «blessed with high tidal range, [sic!] 
Long beach with gentle slope and firm ground facilitating beaching of ships just at the threshold of the plot», [20] 
note: faulty web-page, access requires patience. 
140 Convention art. 6(4); Convention art. 6(2)-(3).  
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The Conventions’ duty to reimport a shipment of waste when the shipment cannot be completed 
as intended or when the shipment is illegal, is not found in the ESRR.141 Instead, a request can 
be made for «the Commission to take action» if there is «an imminent threat» of breach of 
article 13 and/or 15, but the «action» remains unspecified.142 The Regulations review-, 
certification and inspection-procedures function as a long-term preventive measure, reducing 
the amount of, and increasing control over, toxic materials present in ships. The ‘cradle-to-
grave’ approach has a mitigating effect, but as these measures control ships before they become 
‘wastes’, they are less central to the assessment.143 The ESRR lacks immediate preventive 
procedures, and equivalency for measures disruptive of unsound waste-management cannot be 
established.144 
 
Both the Convention and the ESRR require that violations are sanctioned by penalties that are 
«appropriate»145 or «effective, proportionate and dissuasive».146 The difference in the 
frameworks is that where the Convention explicitly criminalise ‘illegal traffic’, therein 
requiring criminal sanctions for such breaches, the ESRR does not criminalise any violations 
of the Regulation.147 The ESRR suggest sanctions of a «civil or administrative nature», and 
removed ESRR-ships from the Environmental Crime Directive.148 The ESRR leaves the nature 
of sanctions for any violation to national discretion and decriminalise previously ‘illegal traffic’ 
under the Convention, which is an obvious lack of equivalency of enforcement. 
 
The ESRR detailed requirements to ships and ship recycling yards set a considerably higher 
standard of ESM for the ship recycling process than the Convention.149 Nevertheless, the 
limited access to control over facilities in third countries, for Community States to inspect or 
execute authority over ESRR-ships within their territorial waters, the forgoing of the PIC-
procedure, the lack of specified preventive measures and decriminalisation amount to a system 
with a reduced ability to enforce the ESM-provisions and an overall lower level of control over 
the waste-management. The conclusion is that the ESRR does not provide an equivalent level 
of control and enforcement as the Convention. 
                                               
141 EWSR art. 22-25 Cf. art. 2(35) & Convention art. 8 and art. 9(2)(a) 
142 ESRR art. 23. 
143 Supra, subchapter 3.2. 
144 [25], [17]. 
145 Convention art. 4(4). 
146 ESRR art. 22(1) 
147 Convention art. 4(3), cf. art. 9; EWSR art. 2(35) cf. ECD art. 3(c). 
148 ESRR preamble (17); ECD art. 3(c). 
149 Note: Convention, not the EWSR, who subject waste to the standards of EU environmental law, which 
already are very high. The ESRR improve upon the EWSR in some respects, but not considerably.  
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3.3.2 Article 11-equivalency of Indian domestic law  
Provided that the 15th CoP also explicitly recognise the ESRR as a valid article 11-instrument, 
the second question is if the Indian domestic law provides an equivalent level of control and 
enforcement as the Convention. 
 
India has not ratified the Ban Amendment, and is not directly affected by it. The article 11-
assessment will therefore focus on control of import, considering that article 4(1)(b) of the 
Convention compels India to respect the Ban Amendment by prohibiting waste-import from its 
Signatories.150 
 
There are two legislative texts in the Indian ship recycling regulation, the first being the Basel-
implementing Shipbreaking Code of 2013 and the second being the HKC-based Recycling of 
Ships Act of 2019. While still an uncompleted work, the latter entered into force when receiving 
the Presidents assent on the 13th of December 2019. There is legal uncertainty regarding the 
regulatory regime, as it is unclear if the Act repeal the Code, or if the two regulations are 
intended to complement one another.151  
 
There are several articles in the Act that address matters that were covered by the Code.152 
Where the Act overlap the Code, the Act often reads «as may be prescribed» as «rules made 
under this act», and the future term heavily indicate that the previous regulation has been 
repealed.153 This is further implied as article 19 use the present term, «as specified by the 
regulations», and by the existence of referrals to specific existing legal sources, such as the 
Factories Act.154 This thesis will presume that the Act has repealed the Code in relation to 
vessels covered by the HKC.155 This presumption does not compromise any referral to the EU 
position on the matter, as they seemingly have drawn the same conclusion.156  
 
By repealing the Code of the Basel Regime through the HKC-based Act, the Indian Government 
has presumably declared that the Act is article 11-equivalent. The EU has not taken a clear 
stance on whether they support this move, stating that the Act is a «clear indication that India 
                                               
150 Supra, subchapter 2.2. 
151 [38]. 
152 E.g. the Act art. 12(5), contra Code art. 5(2) and 8(3).  
153 E.g. the Act, art. 15(2) cf. art. 2(h). 
154 The Act refer to the Factories Act in art. 14-15 
155 The Act, art. 3 cf. art. 5. 
156 Appendix A, para. 23.  
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is committed» to environmentally sound ship recycling, while acknowledging that «further 
information would be necessary on the specific implementing rules».157 The position of the EU 
appears to be that the Act may be article-11 equivalent depending on the specific rules that have 
yet to be prescribed. Unlike the ESRR, the Act has, as of yet, not improved upon the HKC-
requirements to recycling yards.158 The CoP-dissent to the Hong Kong Convention and article 
11-equivalency is almost directly applicable to the Act, and the weight of the CoP set a strong 
biased against accepting equivalency of the Act. The analysis of the Act will limit itself to 
compare three differences between the Act and the Convention, considered sufficient to 
ascertain if it establishes an equivalent level of control.  
 
According to the Act, no ship recycling facility may operate without being inspected and 
granted permission by the Competent Authority in accordance with the provisions in Chapter 
V1, and the ship recycling process is regulated in Chapter V.  
 
Instead of the Conventions PIC-procedure, the Act prescribe that «no Ship Recycler shall 
recycle any ship without a ship recycling plan […] approved by the Competent Authority».159 
The ship itself also need permission for recycling, given «only after physical inspection of the 
ship».160 The waste must undergo an application process in both the Convention and the Act, 
but the Act demand a physical inspection of the vessel. While the Convention require written 
consent, the Act deem both permissions to be tacitly given when «the Competent Authority fails 
to convey its decision […] within fifteen days of its submission».161 Notwithstanding the added 
control of physical inspections, the control of the Act is nevertheless not equivalent to the PIC-
procedure where all wastes are explicitly approved.  
 
Another element relevant for assessing control, is the reporting-procedures. The Competent 
Authority is to report on approved facilities, non-compliant ships and recycled ships to the 
National Authority «from time to time».162 In comparison, the Convention require that the 
Parties «shall transmit […] to the [CoP] […] before the end of each calendar year, a report on 
the previous year», of a substantial list of waste management statistics and activities.163 The 
                                               
157 Appendix A, para. 24. 
158 Act, art. 12(5) 
159 The Act, art. 17(1). 
160 The Act, art. 18(1) cf. art. 20(1). 
161 The Act, art. 17(3); art. 20(2). 
162 The Act, art. 24. 
163 Convention art. 13. 
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Conventions’ reporting obligations are more substantial and more and predictable than the 
requirements of the Act, resulting in a higher level of control.  
 
The third aspect is of the applicability of the Act. The Act article 29(1) uphold that  
 
«Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, the Central Government may […] 
exempt any vessel or class thereof, ship recycling facility or Ship Recycler from any 
specified requirement contained in or prescribed in pursuance of this Act, or dispense 
with the observance of any such requirements, if it is satisfied that the requirement have 
been substantially complied with or that compliance with the requirements is or ought 
to be dispensed within the circumstances of the case».  
 
The competence of exemption is by article 29(1) granted to the Central Government, who «may 
[…] direct that any power, authority or jurisdiction exercisable by it […] under this Act […] 
be exercisable also by the National Authority or Competent Authority or such other officer». 
Power to execute the substantial exception clause can be delegated to any such officer not below 
the rank of Joint Secretary.164 This is a major weakness of the Act, especially when recognizing 
issues of corruption in India.165 The Act allow for a very low and uncertain level of control, not 
equivalent to the Convention which allow for no exceptions. 
 
The Act provide for tacit approval after short review periods, infrequent and unsubstantial 
reporting of its ship recycling activity, and grant access to complete exemptions from the 
prescribed procedures in the Act. Compared to the Conventions PIC-procedure of written 
consent, complete and regular reporting and lack of exemptions, there is no need for a more 
substantial analysis of the Act nor of its not-yet-prescribed complementary legislation to 
conclude the article 11-assessment.  
 
Indian domestic law does not provide an equivalent level of control and enforcement as the 
Convention. 
 
4 The legal matrix of ship recycling in the EU 
The text of article 11 does not accommodate applicability to article 4A as it would derogate the 
prohibition, and the article may not be applied in relation to the Ban Amendment before an 
                                               
164 The Act, art. 3. 
165 Supra, subchapter 1.2; [22], [42]. 
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interpretative CoP Decision expressively state that it can. In the case that such a decision should 
come in the future, neither the ESRR nor the Act are article 11-equivalent, and no article 11-
arrangement can be concluded between the EU and India on the basis of their current legislation.  
 
The position expressed by the EU, that their legal framework exempting ESRR-ships from the 
EWSR, is legal as long as no yard in a non-OECD+ country is added to the EU-list, creates 
uncertainty and lacks legal validity. The distinction between formal authority and exercised 
authority the EC builds their rationale on is questionable at best, but ultimately irrelevant. 
EWSR article 1(3)(i) excludes ESRR-ships from its scope, and by extension from the ECD, 
which cannot be done except through article 11. No such arrangement is present, and the 
exclusion is an act of non-compliance with the Convention.166 
 
4.1 Efficiency 
Both the Basel-regimes’ EWSR and the ESRR are fairly easy to circumvent in the case of ship 
recycling. The EWSR applies to vessels in Community territorial waters from the point in time 
when it is «intended to be […] disposed of», while The ESRR applies to ships as long as they 
are flagged to the Community.167 The result is that shipowners can avoid the applicability of 
both Regulations by sailing the ship out of Community territorial waters and re-flag the vessel 
to a convenient jurisdiction before the intention of conducting a demolition-sale is 
manifested.168 At this point, a decision to recycle the ship is outside the scope of both EU 
Regulations, and the ship can be sold or sailed for recycling anywhere that is accepted by the 
new Flag State.169 Circumvention require planning ahead and caution in the decision-making 
process, but it is very feasible.  
 
When applicable, the Regulations are relatively effective, in the sense that they are able to detect 
violations of the applicable Regulations, and there are enforcement mechanisms to sanction 
unlawful conduct. That being said, the question of whether the Regulations are efficient, 
eligible to achieve their aim to prevent illegal traffic and unsound ship management, is an 
entirely different question.  
 
                                               
166 Where the EWSR and ESRR duplicate one another on procedural matter of certificates, the ESRR-system 
could quite possibly constitute an article 11-agreement. 
167 Supra, chapter 2. 
168 [70] Pt. 4.3.4.2, para. 5. 
169 Supra, subchapter 1.2 on Flag States; The vessel would to avoid Community territorial waters on its break-
up journey not to be encompassed by the EWSR.  
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The ESRR entered into force on the 31st of December 2018 and is fully applicable from the 31st 
of December 2020. Reports from the Community States is due no sooner than 30th of September 
2022. Even though the certifications-requirements to every ESRR-ship undeniably will 
contribute to increase knowledge of which hazards a ship contain, it is nevertheless too early to 
assess the efficiency of that Regulation as a whole.170 The EWSR has been in force since the 
12th of July 2007, and an assessment of its efficiency can safely be executed.171 
 
4.1.1 Case law 
Notwithstanding the domestic nature of penal law, the questions of what constitutes illegal 
traffic are matters of treaty-interpretation and is as such Community relevant case law.172 There 
are two cases of EWSR enforcement that are important contributions to establishing criminal 
liability for perpetrators and accessories for demolition-sales in ship recycling. 
 
The first case is the recently annulled Dutch Seatrade-case of 2018.173 It was a landmark ruling, 
convicting shipping company Seatrade and two of its CFOs’ for the demolition-sales of four 
ships that sailed from Rotterdam and Hamburg, intended to be sold ‘on delivery’ in Alang.174 
Seatrade was fined €750 000, and the CFOs’ got a one-year professional disqualification and 
were fined €50 000. It was the first case in the Community that held the perpetrators criminally 
liable for demolition sales in violation of EWSR article 36.  
 
The second is the Norwegian Harrier-case of 2020, which has been appealed.175 The ship, Eide 
Carrier, was sold by shipping company Eide Marine Eiendom to cash buyer Wirana ‘as is where 
is’ in 2015.176 Wirana sent the ship to sail from Norway to Gadani in 2017, but the ship was 
detained after it broke down, still in Norwegian territorial waters. The perpetrator, Wirana, was 
                                               
170 Infra, subchapter 4.2.1. 
171 EC review based on reports from the Community is expected 31st of December 2020, see also [81]. 
172 The CJEU does not have de jure power of future precedent as there is no doctrine of stare decisis in EU 
law, yet their interpretations are given de facto precedent in Community treaty interpretation [62, p. 832]. Keeping 
in mind that while the system of CJEU/EFTA court is dualistic, allowing only EU-cases to be brought before the 
CJEU (limiting the significance of EEA case law), the novelty increases the importance of domestic EEA-practices 
for interpretation in the Community. 
173 Awaiting retrial since the Hague Court of Appeal could not establish impartiality of the Court, 02/07/2020. 
174 [70]; Spring Bear, Spring Bob, Spring Deli, Spring Panda, (IMO 8220383/8213665/8220424/8213653, 
respectively). 
175 [71]. 
176 Renamed Harrier, IMO 8730479; The sales contract between formally name Julia Shipping Inc as the 
Buyer, but the contract list Wirana-CFO Keyur Dave, as «contact person» in Julia. Julia refuse to disclose its 
ownership structure. The Norwegian Environment Agency consider Wirana as de facto owner of Harrier, but 
were fined as ‘managers’ [15]. 
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in 2019 issued a fine of €700 000 for attempting illegal traffic after EWSR art. 37(5).177 EME 
and its owner Georg Eide were convicted as accessories for the demolition sale and involvement 
with the shipment. Georg Eide was sentenced to 6 months imprisonment and a fine of NOK 
10 000, while EME was fined 2 mNOK.  
 
Holding perpetrators criminally liable for EWSR ‘illegal traffic’ is a novelty in the Community, 
and the two cases signal a significant shift in enforcement practices, and the investigations of 
Eimskip in Iceland or Teekay Shipping in Norway could be vital in further establishing liability 
in the court of law. 
 
Pushing aside the corporate veil on liability in ship demolition-sales could have a chilling effect 
on any undertaking involved in the export of ships for recycling-purposes operating within 
Community territory.178 Yet if the assumption is made, that as long as it is profitable to 
circumvent Community Regulations the shipping industry will continue to do so, then any 
regulating legal instrument must counteract the profitability in order to be efficient.  
 
In the Seatrade-case, the company were paid $11 932 797,07 in the demolition-sale of the four 
ships, while the Court fined the company €750 000.179 Ships that are sold for recycling contain 
high values in materials irrespective of recycling country, and it would be inaccurate to compare 
the total sale price with the fine. The price offered in EU yards are more or less half of prices 
offered in Southeast Asia, so the profit made strictly through waste export was approximately 
$6 000 000.180 Thereto is added that Seatrade beached a total of 15 ships in the period from 
2010-2017, with a total revenue close to $40 000 000.181 Considering the size of the export-
profit, a fine of €750 000 can hardly be considered deterring, and evidently wasn’t for Seatrade, 
who beached two additional ships in Alang even as the legal proceedings were ongoing (see 
Appendix F). 
 
                                               
177 It is unclear why it was prosecuted after implementation of art. 37(5) instead of art. 36. Harrier contained 
260 tons of asbestos [71, p. 21] making it ‘hazardous waste’ subject to the export prohibition, cf. EWSR art. 36 
cf. Annex V 2§2 cf. Annex V Part 1 List A, code A2050.  
178 Initial charges in Harrier included an insurance company and a consultant. 
179 The currency used in ship demolition sales is USD. Where inaccuracies related to exchange rate at the date 
of payments cannot be avoided the original currency is used; Bear $3 184 959,99, Bob $3 233 289,08, Deli 
$2 792 220, Panda $2 722 328, [70] pt. 4.3.3.4. 
180 The EU prices are between 50-75% lower than that offered in Southeast Asia, ranging between 125$/ldt and 
240$/ldt, [37], [46]. Note: the source in [46] is biased (Anil Sharma, founder and CEO of cash buyer GMS), and 
that the calculations of EU prices are in 2020, not 2012 (due to difficulties finding historical statistics). 
Irrespectively, the difference is presumed to have been similar in 2012 as the price gap is a lasting problem, cf. 
supra, chapter 1. 
181 Not adjusted for legal/illegal profit, [7, p. 11]. 
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The profitability of the illegal demolition-sale in the Harrier-case was NOK 4 256 319 
($520 975) for the shipping company, who was fined 2 mNOK ($225 578).182 A rough estimate 
can be made of the profitability for the presumed owner, Wirana.183 As explained in the 
introduction, a cash buyer like Wirana buy ships from shipowners at scrap value, and they are 
called ‘cash buyers’ because they pay the shipowners upfront.  
 
Wirana paid 5 mUSD for the 22 030 ldt ship in July 2015. The median scrap-price in Pakistan 
2017 when the ship was sent for recycling, was between 375-395 $/ldt, similar to India where 
the average was 375 $/ldt (see Appendix G).184 Estimated on basis of these statistics, the 
demolition value that Wirana could expect for Harrier in Gadani in 2017 was approaching 
$8 261 250.185 The anticipated profit at the time Wirana sent the ship for recycling was 
somewhere around 3 mUSD.186 Wirana ended up having to recycle the ship in Turkey at 
decisively lower rates, reducing their profit margin by more or less $1 872 550 to an actual 
profit somewhere around $1 388 700.187 Wirana profited from the demolition sale despite the 
fine of €700 000, although significantly less than anticipated. For cash buyers whose business-
model is based on speculation, claiming to be «working on extremely low and limited margins, 
underwriting market conditions», a loss of $1 872 550 in anticipated profit and a €700 000 fine 
is not insignificant.188  
 
Cash buyers profit margin can be a lot smaller than in the Harrier-case. The cash buyers profit 
in the recent sale of a 28 189 ldt-ship named Janice N was $563 798.189 
 
Fines of €700 000 may reduce or undercut the profit margin for cash buyers entirely, but their 
effect upon the industry is uncertain – it could simply lead to an adjustment of cash buyers’ 
risk-assessments. Nevertheless, the fines for cash buyers are as «dissuasive» as they can get 
                                               
182 The prosecutions illegal profit-adjustment: estimated scrap-value in Turkey NOK 36 654 581 ($4 486 539), 
valued at approximately 203 $/ldt in 2015, cf. [71, p. 38]; DNB exchange-rate fine 27/11/2020 and scrap-value 
30/07/2015. 
183 If Julia Inc is the real buyer, the assessment applies for Julia Inc, minus €700 000. 
184 Pakistani yards paid $2,5 more per ldt than Indian yards, Appendix G, Table 1; Appendix G, Table 2. 
185 $375 x 22 030 LDT = $8 261 250.  
186 Not adjusted for their expenses, Appendix B. 
187 My rough estimation of actual rates and profitability: The scrapping market in Turkey at the time of 
recycling January 2018 was at $290/mt, resulting in an approximate scrap price of 22 030 x 290 = $6 388 700, 
[11]. Profit reduction $6 388 700 - $ 5 000 000 = $1 388 700; estimated profit reduction $8 261 250 - $6 388 700 
= $1 872 550. Note 1: the difference between mt/ldt is inconsequential, cf. figure 3 [11], 2: Harrier was recycled 
in August, but I have not found prices for that month. Based on historic development of prices in 2017, I assess 
that the January prices are sufficient to highlight the price-difference, cf. figure 3 [11] and Table 2 [8]. 
188 [35]. 
189 Janice N (IMO 9084190) was reported sold at 337 $/ldt for 9.5mUSD, leaving 28 189 ldt. The ship was 
eventually bought by the cash buyer for 350 $/ldt and sold for 370 $/ldt, [39]. 
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while still being «proportionate» sanctions.190 For the sake of shipowners, current enforcement-
practices does not counteract the profitability of unsound ship recycling practices and are not 
efficient, as highlighted by the figures above. 
 
4.2 De lege ferenda 
In light of how easy it is for shipowners to circumvent the Regulations, it goes without saying 
that introducing economically viable recycling-options to beaching is of paramount importance 
for the sake of achieving the overarching goal of environmentally sound ship recycling. Several 
corporate initiatives are being taken which present shipowners with associative- or economic 
incentives to promote safe and environmentally sound ship recycling practices.191 
 
From a pragmatic point of view, it should be emphasised that recycling in non-OECD+ 
countries in itself is not undesirable. As highlighted in the introduction, the ship recycling 
countries of Southeast Asia are highly dependent on their ship recycling industry, and to avoid 
an increased north/south-problematics of depriving these countries of important industries, a 
goal should be to incentivise them to increase their standards to an acceptable level of worker 
safety and environmental protection. The rise of facility-standards that has taken place in India 
since the HKC was created proves that the HKC has had a positive impact, and the ESRR is 
suitable to further that same positive development (see Appendix H).192 
 
 
Priya Blue Industries Private Limited [1]: landing area/ drainage facilities/ secondary cutting deck. 
                                               
190 EWSR art. 50(1); ESRR art. 22(1). 
191 CSR-standards: RSRS implemented by banks such as DNB, ABN AMRO, ING, NIBC, KfW-IPEX, 
Nordea, Danske Bank; Sustainable Shipping Initiatives’ SRTI; The Clean Shipping Network, including H&M, 
ABB, Volkswagen and Philips; Norwegian Shipowners’ Association «No to beaching of ships» in 2015; CSR-
standards effect: KLP divest from NAT [78]; NBIM divest from Precious Shipping and Evergreen Marine [79], 
the latter subsequently joined SRTI in 2020 [80].  
192 «the Indian ship-recycling industry has taken some positive steps to reduce work-related fatalities and 
incidents […] e.g. asbestos chambers, although the research group found these were not used» [74, p. 33]. 
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The first picture is from the Priya Blue facilities in Alang, which was the first yard in India to 
receive a Statement of Compliance to the HKC from a classification society.193 Priya Blue 
applied for inclusion on the EU-list, but was found wanting in several areas, inter alia for 
beaching ships by dismantling them in the intertidal zone (left picture). The picture below is 
from Y. S. Investments in Alang. The difference in standard between Priya Blue and Y. S. 
Investments is evident, and the latter who employ the landing-method was awarded a SoC to 
the ESRR by Lloyds Register in May 2019. Despite the certification by a widely recognized 
classification society, the yard still has not been accepted to the EU-list as the Commissions 
verifier, DNV-GL uncovered five discrepancies in their inspections in 2019.194 Nevertheless, 
the yard is an example of a standard that is very close to compliance with EU-requirements.  
 
 
Y. S. Investments [2]: yard/ secondary cutting deck with drainage, lading-method landing, cf. [2] art. 16(2)(a). 
Working under the presumption that the ESRR-standards prohibit ship recycling methods that 
allow for the hazardous wastes to seep into the ground or be washed into the sea, despite the 
cutting occurring on beaches with high tidal range, this is a very positive development.195  
 
As long as the Ban Amendment prohibit all EWSR and ESRR-ships from being recycled in 
non-OECD+ countries, neither Regulation can contribute to raising the standards of the non-
OECD+ yards further than the level of HKC-compliance exemplified by Priya Blue, despite 
being in the environmental interest of developing countries and in the interest of their 
development. For the sake of environmentally sound ship recycling, EU-compliance to the 
Basel Convention and of eco-sustainable development in the Community and non-OECD+ 
                                               
193 SoC issued by ClassNK. An SoC is not a certification an actual HKC-certification, as the HKC has yet to 
enter into force.  
194 When a yard situated in third countries apply for inclusion on the EU-list, they must first by inspected by 
and obtain certification from an independent verifier. This certification is sent as the application to the EC, cf. 
ESRR art. 15(4); [28] and [2]. 
195 Although research commissioned by the EC in 2016 concluded that «the Indian ship-recycling industry […] 
always uses the beaching technique and significant improvements cannot take place until a dry dock is used», [74, 
p. 33]. 
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countries alike, the question should be raised: what can be done by the EU to create an article 
11-arrangement with India on the basis of the ESRR?  
 
4.2.1 The road to compliance for the ESRR 
The accession of the Ban Amendment was a drastic change in the Conventions provisions of 
waste management, devaluating previously issued CoP-statements regarding article 11 and the 
HKC. As shown in chapter 3, no Party can in good faith apply article 11 to article 4A as that 
would be conduct in direct conflict with the treaty text. The change in circumstance require the 
CoP to give its explicit acceptance for such application to be lawful. 
 
Should the CoP accept applicability, it would be appropriate to provide further elaboration on 
what «equivalent level of control and enforcement» entails in the Decision. The ESRR can be 
made lawful eighter through direct acceptance by the CoP or through achieving article 11-
equivalency.196 
 
As identified in the article 11-analysis of the ESRR, the Regulation must be subjected to several 
amendments to establish an equivalent level of control and enforcement as the Convention. 
Equivalency of control cannot be achieved without the re-establishment the level of authority 
given to export and transit countries under the Convention, while equivalent level of 
enforcement conditions the re-establishment of criminal liability for violations and specified 
preventive measures to replace the take-back obligation.  
 
The question of what constitutes equivalent control regarding the written approval for import 
and export in the Convention contra tacit approval in the Regulation is more nuanced. On one 
side, if every ship and ship recycling plan must receive a written approval, the administrative 
burden might be so significant that the quality of the review could suffer by it. On the other 
side, running the risk of letting approvals be given without the ships or recycling plan having 
been reviewed is similarly damaging. The question of written or tacit approval should be 
reviewed in light of relevant administrative and industry statistics, and if tacit approval is able 
to provide an equivalent level of control, the ESRR should at the very least establish an 
appropriate minimum review period.  
 
                                               
196 The ESRR applies as a regional agreement for the Community which must achieve article 11-equivalency 
to be valid, even without the EU-India agreement. 
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Regarding the EU-India trade agreement, the CoP could clarify whether both the legislation of 
the exporting and importing country needs to be article 11-equivalent. There is however no 
explicit requirement of dual equivalency in Parties domestic legislation in the treaty nor in the 
CoP-statements. The text mention only «agreements or arrangements», and the CoP has not 
addressed conditions beyond article 11-equivalency.  
 
As it stands, an article 11-arrangement without dual equivalency in the legislation of the 
countries involved is a theoretical possibility.197 Furthermore, the possibility is also practical 
«taking into account the interests of developing countries», as it can aid in establishing of higher 
level of control and raise industry standards in developing countries.198 In line with the letter 
and purpose of the Convention article 11, the EU can seek to establish an article 11-arrangement 
with India through improving the ESRR while mitigating the identified deficiencies in the 
Indian Act through the trade agreements’ provisions.199 The agreement should also require 
frequent reports on the recycling of ESRR-ships to the Commission, to supervise and verify 
continuing compliance in the recycling-practices (see Appendix H).200  
 
A report issued by EMSA in May 2020 suggest that the Regulations’ effectiveness suffers 
severely on account of out-flagging practices.201 The «proposed way forward» present some 
very interesting measures to counteract the derogating effect of out-flagging practices have on 
the effectiveness of the ESRR. The Directorate General Environment and the Commission 
propose the implementation of a financial incentive for shipowners to recycle within the 
Community, a Ship Recycling License to subsidize the cost-gap between the Community and 
Southeast Asia, and expanding the scope of the ESRR to include vessels under beneficial 
ownership in the Community, irrespective of Flag State.202  
 
As the Community owned fleet constitutes approximately 35-40% of the world fleet, 
implementing regulation based on beneficial ownership would prohibit circumvention by out-
flagging to Flags of Convenience and increase the effectiveness of EU regulations, while also 
provide a powerful incentive to raise global industry standards. Despite the current state of the 
industry and the EU Regulations’ non-conformity with public international law, the political, 
                                               
197 That being said, it would difficult to do so without equivalency in at least one Partys’ legislation.  
198 Convention art. 11 
199 Supra, subchapter 3.2.2. 
200 E.g. by adding a report-obligation to the existing documentation-obligation in ESRR art. 13(1)(j), who per 
now are only required «if requested» by the Competent Authority. 
201 [3], para. 29. 
202 ESRR preamble (19); [3], para. 30-33; [19]. 
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legal and industrial developments and initiatives gives hope for a future ship recycling industry 



































































Transactions and cash flows in ship recycling 
 



































Hazardous materials in ships 
 




















Heavy metal concentration in the sediments of Chattogram Bangladesh 
 
 
Table 1: Heavy metal concentrations in the sediments of breaking sites in Chattogram, 
Bangladesh, 2006.  






Table 2: estimation of accumulated hazardous wastes amounts between 2010-2030 in 
Chattogram, Bangladesh and Gadani, Pakistan.  














Table 3: Volume of sand to 0.2m depth under water with predicted sea level rise.  







Table 4: Pollutants submerged with predicted sea level rise (in kg).  



























Statistical table of world fleet over 100 GT, anno 31. December 2018 





















Seatrade demolition-sales 2010-2017 

































Demolition market 2017 
 
Table 1: Average demolition prices in 2017. 





Table 2: Tanker scrapping ldt prices, source weekly shipping report. 
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